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COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF MODERN
DESERT: VENGEFUL, DEONTOLOGICAL, AND
EMPIRICAL
P AUL

H.

ROBINSON*

I. INTRODUCTION

THE dispute over the role desert should play, if any, in assessing
criminal liability and punishment has a long and turbulent history.
"Deserved punishment" - referred to variously as desert, just
punishment, retributive punishment, or simply "doing justice" 1 - has
moved to center stage in the UK and is on its way in the US, both in
academic debate and in real world institutions.
The English Criminal Justice Act 1 99 1 was intended to set desert as
the dominant principle in sentencing1 but the failure of the drafters to
use language making this explicit led to a serious undermining of the
principle in subsequent interpretation and application of the Act by a
judiciary who never favored the approach.2 The Criminal Justice Act
2003 has only continued the muddle by, on the one hand, simply
including desert as one on a list of five traditional alternative, and
conflicting, purposes of sentencing in section 1 42, while on the other
hand, apparently adopting a proportionality p rinciple in section
143(1 ), which has now been adopted as the central principle for
sentencing in the first guidelines of the Sentencing Guideline Council. 3
In the US, a number of sentencing guidelines have adopted desert
as their distributive principle,4 and it is increasingly given deference in
the '"purposes" section of state criminal codes, 5 where it can be the
guiding principle in the interpretation and application of the code's
provisions .6 Indeed, the American Law Institute recently revised the
Colin S . Di1-er Professor of Law . U niversity o f Pennsylvania Law Schoo l . The author wi shes to
tha n k And1·ew von H i rsch. of Cambridge Un iversity. for his i n sights and help. Desi ree
Liverseiclgc for her valuable research assistance. and Dean Edward R ubin . ot· Vanderbilt La II'
School. for discussions that stimulated much of the work on this article.
1 A. von Hirsch. Doi11g Jusricc (New York !97 6 )
A . Ashworth. ScllfL'Ilcing and Criminal Jusricc. 4'" ed . . (Cambridge 200 5 ) . pp.98 - I0 I : see . e. g ..
Cunningham (!993) 14 Cr. App. R. ( S ) 444 at 447.
Sen tencing Guideline Counc i l . Ovcrarching Principles: Seriousness (2004).
..
� E.g . 204 Pa. Code § 303. 1 ! (200 5): see M. Tonry. · ·u.S. Sentencing Systems Fragmenting . in
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E.g . Cal. Pen a l Code § 1170( a )( I) (West ! 9 8 5 ) ( ' "The legislature finds and declares that the
purpose of i m prisonment for crime is punishme n t .").
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M odel Penal Code (the first since the Code's promulgation in 1 962) so
as to set desert as the official dominant principle for sentencing.7 And
courts have identified desert as the guiding principle in a variety of
contexts,8 as with the Supreme Court's enthroning retributivism as the
"primary justification for the death penalty. "9
In both countries there remains substantial controversy over the
reliance upon desert as the distributive principle for liability and
punishment. A central criticism in the English debate seems to be that
desert as a distributive principle would fail to avoid avoidable crime. 1 0
Interestingly, a central criticism in the American debate is something
of the reverse: that desert is inappropriate as a distributive p rinciple
because it is mean-spirited and harsh, and because it has an unhealthy
preference for prison . 1 1 In both the American and English debates
there exist a variety of other complaints, including obj ections that
desert is based upon only vague notions that at most mark punishment
extremes to be avoided, objections that people are in hopeless
disagreement about what desert requires, objections that it is immoral,
and objections that it is impracticable to implement .1 2
This article argues that many of these objections are valid, at least
when applied to one or another conception of desert, but that there are
at least three distinct conceptions of desert to be found in the current
debates, typically without distinction being made between them . The
three include what might be called vengeful desert, deontological
desert, and empirical desert. Each of the offered criticisms of desert is a
fair objection to one of these conceptions of desert but an unfair
objection to another. Thus, an accurate assessment of desert as a
distributive principle requires that these three conceptions of desert be
distinguished from one another, and that the strengths and weaknesses
of each conception be j udged on its own .
II.

COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF DESERT: VENGEFUL,
DEONTOLOGICAL, AND EMPIRICAL

Three conceptions of desert are evident in the present debates over the
propriety of desert as a distributive principle for criminal liability and
punishment.
7
�
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American L a w Institute. M odel P e n a l Code § 1 .02( 2 ) ( adopted May 1 6. 2007 ) [hereinafter M PC
Amendment).
See. for example, the US cases Spa:iano v. Florida, 468 U . S . 447, 462 ( 1 9 8 4 ) : Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U . S . 1 5 3 , 1 8 3-84 ( 1 9 7 6 ) : M. Cotton, "Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution
as a n Articulated Purpose o f Criminal P u nishment" ( 2000 ) 3 7 Am. Cri m . L. Rev. 1313, 1 326-27,
1 357.
Spa:iw10 v . Florida, 4 6 8 U . S . a t 46 1 .
See Part I I I . F . below.
See Parts I I I .A.-C. below.
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A. Vengeful Desert
A conception of desert used by many writers, what might be called
"vengeful desert," is captured in the often-quoted biblical phrase: "eye
for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for
burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe. " 13 I t urges punishing an
offender in a way that mirrors the harm or suffering he has caused,
typically identified as lex talionis: "the principle or law of retaliation
that a punishment inflicted should correspond in degree and in kind to
the offense of the wrongdoer."'" In Kant's words: "For the only time a
criminal cannot complain that a wrong is done to him [by punishment]
is when he brings his evil deed back upon himself, and what is done to
him in accordance with penal law is what he has perpetrated on
others . "'5
Some writers argue that lex talionis does not require inflicting the
exact harm on the offender that the offender inflicted on his victim,
but only requires the imposition of a relevantly similar deprivation. 16
This variation thus takes a less demanding form, requiring only that
the punishment be proportionate to the harm caused, 1 7 sometimes
captured by the suggestion that "the punishment should fit the
crime. "'s But even in this dil uted form, the primary focus of vengeful
desert remains the extent of the harm of the offence . 19
Because of this focus on the harm done, the vengeful conception of
desert is commonly associated with the victim's perspective.
Retributive justice "consists in seeking equality between offender
and victim by subjecting the offender to punishment and commu
nicating to the victim a concern for his or her antecedent suffering. "211
''[I]n willing the crime, he willed that he himself should suffer in the
same degree as his victim." 2 1 And the association with the victim's
suffering, in turn, associates vengeful desert with the feelings of
revenge and hatred that we commonly see in victims . Thus, punish
ment under this conception of desert is sometimes seen as essentially
an institutionalisation of victim revenge; it is "injury inflicted on a
''
14
I'
1"
17
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Exodus 2 1 :24 -2 5 .

The Rundum House Diuionurr o{the English Language ( N ew York 1 966). p . 8 2 5 .
I . Kant. The J'v!ewphrsic.\ or Morals (Mary Gregor trans . . Cambridge 1 99 1 ) p . l 69.
See J . Waldron. · · Lex Talionis · · ( 1 992) 34 Ariz. L . Rev. 25. 25-27.
..
J . Dressler. · ·The W i sdom and Morality of Present-Day Criminal Sentencing (200.5) 3 8 Akron
L. Rev. 8.53 . 860. For a modern d efence of this '·reciprocity princi ple. · · as it is sometimes called.
see L. Cmcker_ · ·The Upper Limit o f Just Punishment"" ( 1 992) 41 Emory L.J. l 059. l 06.5.
See. for example. J .C. Oleson. · ·comment: The Punitive Coma" (2002) 90 Calif. L. Rev. 829. n.
59: R . L . Christopher. "The Prosecutor's D i lemma: Bargains and Punishments" ( 200.3 ) 72
Fo rdham L . Rev. 93, 1 27 .
See N . Lacey. Swte Punishml'llt: Political Principles and Conununitl· Values ( L ondon 1 994 ) . p . I 7 :
C . L . Ten. Crime. Guilt. and Punishment ( O x ford 1 98 7 ) . p . l 52.
G . P. Fletcher. "The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution" ( 1 999) 3 B u ff. Crim. L . Rev
5 1 . .58.
J . Feinberg and H . Gross (eds. ) . Philo.1ophr o{Lmr. 2nd ed. (Belmont 1 98 0 ) . p . 54 1 .
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wrongdoer that satisfies the retributive hatred felt by that wrongdoer's
victim and that is justified because of that satisfaction.'' 22

B. Deon tological Desert
The deontological conception of desert focuses not on the harm of the
offense but on the blameworthiness of the offender, as drawn from the
arguments and analyses of moral philosophy. 23 " I t is morally fitting
that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his
wrongdoing. That a criminal should be punished fol lows from his
guilt, and the severity of the appropriate punishment depends on the
depravity of his act. " 24
Thus, the criterion for assessing punishment is broader and richer
than that for vengeful desert : Anything that affects an offender's
moral blameworthiness is taken into account in judging the punish
ment he deserves. The extent of the harm caused or the seriousness of
the evil done will be part of that calculation but so too will be a wide
variety of other factors, such as the offender's culpable state of mind
or lack thereof and the existing conditions at the time of the offence,
including those that might give rise to claims of justification, excuse, or
mitigation. A typical expression of this conception might be: "The
offender deserves a particular punishment not simply for an act which
causes harm but according to his personal responsibility for
committing the act . This evaluation necessarily includes a review of
the broad array of forces operating upon the individual to ascertain
the extent of the individual's responsibility . " 2 5
A key aspect of the deontological conception o f desert, which
distinguishes it from empirical desert, discussed immediately below, is
that it transcends the particular people and situation at hand and
embodies a set of principles derived from fundamental values,
principles of right and good, and thus will produce j ustice without
regard to the political, social, or other peculiarities of the situation at
hand . As Henry Sidgwick famously put it, moral judgments are made
"from the point of view of the universe . " 2 6
22
'3

2
4

25
2"

J. Fein berg and J. Coleman ( eds . ) . Philosophl· ofLall'. 6th cd. ( Belmont 2000). p . 793.
The most promi nent English advocates of desert . von H i rsch and D u ff, c o n ceive ot' desert in this
form. as t'ocusing upon a n o ffender's m o ral blameworthiness, although they o ffe r different
accounts of why this should be so. von Hirsch does so for instrumental reasons. avoiding crime.
and Duff fo r deontological reasons, doing j ustice. See A. Duff. Punishmenr. Communiwrion and
Conununin· ( Oxford 200 I); von Hirsch and Ashworth. Proporrimwte Senrencing: Exploring rile
Principles ( O x ford 2005 ) .
J . Rawls. ··Two Concepts of R u les" ( 1 95 5 ) 64 Philosophical. Review 3 , 5 . Cent ral here are the
writings of Immanuel Kant. See ·'The Metaphysics ot' M orals'' i n H. Reiss . e d . , and H. B. N isbet
trans .. lmnwnud Kanr: Political Wrirings (Cambridge 1 99 1 ) . p l 56
S. Pillsbury . ··Emotional Justice: I'vloralizing the Passions of Cri1ninal Punishn1ent"· ( 1989 ) 74
Cornell L. Rev. 655. 663.
H. Sidgwick, The Aierhods o/Erhics, 7th ed . . ( London 1 907). pp.420-2 1 .
.

.

C.L.J.

JV!odern Desert
C.

1 49

Empirical Desert

Empirical desert, like deontological desert, focuses on the blame
worthiness of the offender. But in determining the principles by which
punishment is to be assessed, it looks not to philosophical analyses but
rather to the community's intuitions of justice . The primary source of
the principles, then, is empirical research into those factors that drive
people's assessments of blameworthiness.27 The existing studies
suggest that the variety of factors at work are as rich and varied as
those at work in determining deon to logical desert. 2 8 The extent of the
harm or evil plays an important role, but is only one of a wide variety
of factors, including many related to the offender's situation and
personal capacities .
Also like deontological desert, this conception envisions a set of
liability and punishment rules to be applied identically to all
defendants; it is not the community's view of deserved punishment
in a particular case that is relevant here . Further, in collecting data to
construct the rules, real cases, especially publicly known cases,
typically are not a useful source . People's views on such cases are
commonly biased by political or social context or by other factors,
such as race, that all would agree have no proper role in setting
principles of justice. 2 9 Instead, the community's i ntuitions of justice are
derived from controlled social science studies that determine the
factors that influence people's assessment of a violator's blame
worthiness, not by asking people about abstract factors but rather by
having them "sentence" a variety of carefully constructed variations of
cases to see what factors influence their punishment judgements.
It is obvious why one might support a deontological desert
distribution: to do justice. But why would one support an empirical
desert distribution? Why should we care about the community's
intuitions of justice? Just because the community's intuitions suggest a
certain punishment is doing justice, it does not make it so, even if there
is a strong agreement on those intuitions.
The reasons offered in support of an empirical desert distribution
lie not in its moral implications but in its practical consequences. If the
criminal law tracks the community's intuitions of justice in assigning
liability and punishment, it is argued, the law gains access to the power
and efficiency of stigmatisation, it avoids the resistance and subversion
inspired by an unjust system, it gains compliance by prompting people
to defer to it as a moral authority in new or grey areas (such as insider
27
28

29

See P . H . Robinson and J . M . Darley, ''Utility of Desert" ( 1 99 7 ) 9 1 N w . U . L . R e v . 453. 456-58.
See. for example, P. H. Robinson and J. M . Darley, Justice. Liahi!it\' ami Blame ( Boulder 1 99 5 ),
pp. 203-208.
P . H. Robinson and R . Kurzban, " Concordance and ConDict in I n tuitions of Justice" ( 2 007 ) 9 1
Minn. L . Rev. 1 829.
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trading), and it earns the ability to help shape of powerful influence of
societal norms.
[T]he criminal law's moral credibility is essential to effective crime
control, and is enhanced if the distribution of criminal liability is
perceived as "doing justice," that is, if it assigns liability and
punishment i n ways that the community perceives as consistent
with the community's principles of appropriate liability and
punishment. Conversely, the system's moral credibility, and
therefore its crime control effectiveness, is undermined by a
distribution of liability that deviates from community perceptions
of just desert. 30
Another writer suggests :
[In criminal law enforcement] all is not positivism and command.
The criminal law can only truly shape norms if it commands some
moral respect. In the absence of a constable o n every corner, the
mere command of a law that moves too far ahead of existing
notions of justice and morality will not s ucceed in shaping
behavior. It is also unlikely to be enforced consistently in a society
where the mechanisms of enforcement are susceptible to demo
cratic pressure . 3 1
Part I I . E . l . examines in greater detail the justifications offered i n
support of the empirical conception of desert and the distributive
implications of those j ustifications.

D. Vengeful Versus Other Conceptions of Desert
Vengeful desert differs from deontological and empirical desert
several respects with important implications.

111

The Role of Punishrnent Amoun t: Ordinal Ranking of Cases Versus
Punishmen t Con tinuum Endpoint

1.

The most important difference between vengeful desert and the other
two conceptions of desert is the importance the former gives to the
absolute amount of punishment to be imposed . For vengeful desert,
this absolute amount is its central focus: It must be equal in amount, if
not also in means, to the suffering caused by the offence conduct. But
for deontological and empirical desert, the absolute amount o f
punishment i s of limited interest. Their central concern is the relative
amount of punishment among cases of differing degrees of moral
blameworthiness. These latter conceptions of j ustice focus primarily
..
-'" Robinson and Darley. "Utility of Desert. above note '27. at 457-5 8 .
.. ('200'2) 51 Emory L . J . 7 5 3 . 838--39
-'1 J . E. Kennedy. "Making the Crime Fit the Punishment
(footnotes omitted).
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on ensuring that the offender is given that amount of punishment that
puts him in his proper ordinal rank among all cases of differing
degrees of blameworthiness.32
Once a society has committed itself to a particular endpoint for its
punishment continuum , which all societies must do - be it the death
penalty, life imprisonment, fifteen years imprisonment, or something
less - the ordinal rank of any given case necessarily converts to a
specific amount of punishment: that amount of punishment that sets
the offender at his appropriate ordinal rank . But for deontological and
empirical desert, the amount of punishment has no other significance.
If the endpoint of the punishment continuum changes, the amount of
p unishment that an offender deserves under these two conceptions of
justice also changes, to the amount o f punishment necessary to keep it
in its proper ordinal rank.
Thus, while the absolute severity of punishment is central to
vengeful desert - it ought to approximate the suffering of the offense it is of limited relevance to deontological and empirical desert. Those
latter conceptions of desert may play some role in a society's setting its
punishment continuum endpoint but, even in performing this role,
these conceptions of desert operate differently than they do when
performing their core function of establishing the proper ordinal rank
of each case . In setting the punishment continuum endpoint, these
conceptions typic ally offer only general guidance as to extremes that
should be avoided, rather than to give guidance as the specific
endpoint to pick_:n

The Role of Punishmen t Method: Punishmen t lv!ethod Versus
Amount

2.

Another characteristic that deontological and empirical desert share,
which is not shared by vengeful desert, is the significance given to
punishment method. The latter cares about the method of punishment:
Ideally , it matches the means by which the victim was made to suffer.
Failing this , it should be imposed in a way that is at least relevant to
the nature of the offense, if that is possible. Thus, for example, the
vengeful conception of desert is thought to support the use of the
death penalty in cases of murder. 34
In contrast, deontological and empirical conceptions of desert h ave
no such interest in the method of punishment. Their focus is on the
amount of punishment - an amount that will put the offender in his
proper ordinal rank according to his blameworthiness . As long as the
3�
33

34

A. von H i rsch. Pasr or Furure Crimes: Deserl'edness and Dangerousness in the Sentencing of
Criminals ( New Brunswick 1 98 5 ) . p p . 39-46.
See the discussion o f l i miting retributivism at Part I II . D .
See, e.g., J . Vorenberg. Criminal La11' and Procedure, 2 n d ed. ( New York 1 98 1 ) . p.40.
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total pumtlve "bi te" of the punishment achieves this ranking, these
conceptions of desert have little reason to care about the method by
which that amount of punitive "bite" is imposed . 35
While a variety of different sanctioning methods might be used, the
offender should get punishment "credit" for each only in proportion
to the punitive "bite" of that method. This requires, then , establish
ment of ratios between the different punishment methods that reflect
the differences in their punitive "bite . " I f the "bite" of one week in j ai l
is equivalent to that of a month of weekends in j ail o r is equivalent to
that of 80 hours of community service, these conceptions of desert
would be satisfied with any of these sentences, so long as that amount
of punishment was the amount deserved given the o ffender's blame
worthiness. The i deal equivalency table would be one that generates
alternative sanctions about which an offender and a community are
indifferent as to which is imposed . 36
E.

D eontological Versus Empirical Desert

The discussions above suggest that deontological desert and empirical
desert have many similarities. M ost importantly, they both focus upon
the blameworthiness of the offender. But there also are important
differences between these two conceptions of desert, as one might
expect, given that the notions of blameworthiness upon which they are
based are q uite different . The deontological conception of desert is
based upon reasoned analysis from principles of right and good, which
produce a transcendent notion of j ustice independent of the intuitions
of j ustice of the community. The empirical conception of desert has no
such independent basis. I t does not look to true moral blame
worthiness in any transcendent sense; it looks only to people's shared
intuitions about assigning blameworthiness .
These differences in underlying criterion can produce important
differences in the distribution of liability and punishment. F o r
example, moral philosophers disagree about t h e significance o f
resulting harm - for example, whether to punish completed attempts
the same as the substantive offense - and each side of the debate has
plausible arguments to make. In contrast, all available data suggest a
nearly universal and deeply held view among the community that
resulting harm does matter, that it increases an o ffender's deserved
punishment. 37 This is only one of a host of issues on which moral
35

See. for example, l'vl. S. Moore. ··The Moral Worth o f Retribution. i n Responsibility. Character
and Emotions" in F . Schocman (ed.). Rnponsihi/itr. Clwruclc'l'. and rlzc Enwrions (Cambridge
1988). p.l 80.

'" For discussion of punishment "bite" equivalency tables. see text accompanying note 56. below.
37 See. e.g.. Robinson and Darley. Jusrice. Liuhilitr and Blum!'. above note 28. at 14--28. 181-96: J .
H . Mansfield et a!.. "Comment. C ausation i n the Law " ( 1964) 1 7 Yand. L . Rev. 487. 494-95.
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philosophy's analytic conclusions may vary from the empirical data on
lay persons' intuitions of justice.38
Perhaps even more important than such differences in blame
worthiness judgments are the differences between the underlying
theories that drive the two conceptions of desert and that thereby
shape their application. In its most fundamental form, the difference is
this: The special value of the empirical conception of desert is its
utilitarian effectiveness in crime-control; the special value of the
deontological conception of desert is its ability to produce true
principles of j ustice independent of personal or community opinion.
1.

The Utility of Desert

As has been suggested elsewhere, 39 there are good arguments to
suggest that there is great utility in a distribution of liability and
punishment according to people's shared intuitions of justice, perhaps
greater than the utility of distributing liability and punishment in the
traditional utilitarian manner (to optimise deterrence, rehabilitation,
or incapacitation). To summarise the arguments briefly:
First, some of the system's power to control conduct derives from
its potential to stigmatise violators - with some potential offenders this
is a more powerful, yet essentially cost-free, control mechanism
compared to imprisonment. Yet the system's ability to stigmatise
depends upon it having moral credibility with the community . That is,
for a conviction to trigger stigmatisation, the law must have earned a
reputation for accurately assessing from the community's view what
does and does not deserve moral condemnation. Liability and
punishment rules that deviate from a community's shared intuitions
of justice undercut this reputation.
Second, the effective operation of the criminal justice system
depends upon the cooperation or at least the acquiescence of those
involved in it: - offenders; judges; jurors; witnesses; prosecutors;
police; and others . To the extent that people see the system as unj ust,
as in conflict with their intuitions about justice, that acquiescence and
cooperation is likely to fade and be replaced with subversion and
resistance . And offenders may be inspired to fight the adjudication and
correctional processes rather than to participate and acquiesce in it. I f
people see the system as failing t o d o j ustice, i t may inspire, i n its may
be the most dramatic reaction, vigilantism, but also may inspire other
.1 R
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For comm u n i ty views o n a wide variety of criminal law issues. see P . H . Robinson. ''The Role of
M oral P h i l osophers in the Competition Between P h ilosophical and Empirical . Desert" (2007) 48
Wm. and M a ry L . Rev. 1 8 3 1 - 1 843.
For a fuller acco unt see Robinson and Darley, ''Utility of Deser t " , n o te 27 above; P . H .
Robinson and J . Darley, " I ntui tions o f Justice: I mplications for Crimi nal L a w and J ustice
Policy" (2007) 8 1 So. Calif. L. Rev. I.
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less dramatic but more common distortions of the system. A lack of
credibility of either sort, regular injustice or failures of justice, can
provoke resistance and subversion. Jurors may disregard their j ury
instructions. Police officers, prosecutors, and judges m ay make up
their own rules . Witnesses may lose an incentive to o ffer accurate
information or testimony.
Perhaps the greatest utility of desert comes through a more subtle
but potentially more influential form. The real power to gain
compliance with society's rules of prescribed conduct lies not in the
threat of official criminal sanction, but in the forces of social influence .
The networks of interpersonal relationships in which people find
themselves, the social norms and prohibitions shared among those
relationships and transmitted through those social networks, and the
internalised representations of those norms and moral p recepts control
people's conduct. The law is not irrelevant to these social and personal
forces. Criminal law, in particular, plays a central role in creating and
maintaining the social consensus necessary for sustaining moral
norms . In fact, in a society as diverse as ours, the criminal law may
be the only society-wide mechanism that transcends cultural and
ethnic differences . Thus, the criminal law's most impo rtant real-world
effect may be its ability to assist in the building, shaping, and
maintaining of these norms and moral principles . It can contribute to
and harness the compliance-producing power o f interpersonal
relationships and personal morality.
Finally, the criminal law also can have effect in gaining compliance
with its commands through another mechanism: If it earns a
reputation as a reliable statement of what the community perceives
as condemnable, people are more likely to defer to its commands as
morally authoritative and as appropriate to follow in those b orderline
cases in which the propriety of certain conduct is unsettled or
ambiguous in the mind of the actor. The importance of this role
should not be underestimated; in a society with the complex
interdependencies characteristic of ours, an apparently harmless
action can have destructive consequences . When the action is
criminalised by the legal system, one would want the citizen to
"respect the law" in such an instance even tho ugh he o r she does not
immediately intuit why that action is banned . Such deference will be
facilitated if citizens are disposed to believe that the law is an accurate
guide to appropriate prudential and moral behaviour.
The extent of the criminal law's effectiveness in all these respects in bringing the power of stigmatisation to bear, in avoiding resistance
and subversion to a system perceived as unjust, in faci litating,
communicating, and maintaining societal consensus o n what is and
is not condemnable, and in gaining compliance in borderline cases
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through deference to its moral authority - is to a great extent
dependent on the degree to which the criminal law has gained moral
credibility in the minds of the citizens governed by it. Thus, the
criminal law's moral credibility is essential to effective crime control,
and is enhanced if the distribution of criminal liability is perceived as
"doing justice," that is, if it assigns liability and punishment in ways
that the community perceives as consistent with its shared intuitions of
justice. Conversely, the system's moral credibility, and therefore its
crime control effectiveness, is underm ined by a distribution of liability
that deviates from community perceptions of just desert .
2.

The Problem of Immoral Intuitions

While empirical desert has the advantage of crime control utility, its
reliance upon the community's intuitions of justice presents a serious
disadvantage. The community's intuitions of j ustice could be wrong,
even if there is a high degree of agreement about them. Empirical
desert can tell us only what people think is just; only deontological
desert can tell us what is actually j ust. Like slave owners in the Old
South or anti-Semitic Germans before World War II, one may fail to
appreciate the injustice of one's views until later, especially if one's
views at the time are shared by a large number of other people . Even a
popular liability or punishment rule may be unjust. Only deontological
desert can spot these justice errors in people's intuitions and can
provide a conception of desert that transcends time, community, and
culture. Only deontological desert can give us the means by which we
can tell the truth of what is deserved, insulated from the vicissitudes of
human irrationality .
III.

RESULTING CONFUSIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF DESERVED
PUNISHMENT

I t is argued here that the failure to appreciate the existence of these
three quite different conceptions of desert - vengefuL deontological,
and empirical - commonly leads to confusion in the critique of desert
as a principle for the distribution of criminal liability and punishment.
That is, criticisms of "desert" are sometimes offered without
appreciating that the criticism may be valid with regard to one
conception of desert but not another, thus leading writers to rej ect
"desert" generally while in fact their criticisms only suggest rejecting
one or another specific conception of desert . Further, even when the
issue is not the propriety of desert as a distributive principle generally
but rather its implications on a specific issue - such as whether it calls
for use of prison or the death penalty - the failure to appreciate the
existence of these different conceptions of desert leads writers to use
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arguments rightly critical of one conception of desert to draw
conclusions that they apply to a different conception of desert .
Consider the range of criticisms offered against desert .

A. Harsh?
The most common American complaint against a desert-based
distribution is that it necessarily p rovides "harsh" or "severe"
punishment . 40 As one writer explains, the desert model "is an
articulation at the practical, policy level of the new law and order
ideology which has replaced the liberal , social democratic consensus
that saw crime as a symptom of deprivation or malaise. Disillusion
with the effects of the model in practice should lead to a profound
dislike of its principles, and its inherent, inevitable, right-wing,
repressive slant should be acknowledged. "41
Because vengeful desert focuses primarily on the harm done, with
little reference to the offender's situation and capabilities, it is easy to
see how the resulting punishment can be perceived as being overly
harsh (at least from the perspective of deontological or empirical
desert), for it ignores many factors that both moral philosophers and
the community would think are relevant in assessing blameworthiness.
Thus, while the harshness criticism may seem valid when applied to
vengeful desert, it is misguided when applied to deontological and
empirical desert . Indeed, the primary criterion of deontological desert
is that the punishment be precisely that which is deserved, no more and
no less . Similarly, empirical desert seeks to give the o ffender exactly
what he deserves according to principles of justice derived from the
community's intuitions of justice . I t would be odd indeed, then, to find
substantial complaint that an empirical desert distribution was j udged
to be systematically harsh.
Of course, any particular writer m ay have his or her own particular
views about exactly what desert requires . And often a criticism that
''desert" is too harsh or severe (or not harsh or severe enough) is
simply a product of that person's particular view. Thus, a writer may
believe that "economic, social, cultural, or psychological depriva
tions" should excuse criminal conduct, and therefo re may conclude
that a criminal justice system that does not embody this view is
"harshly punitive."42 But this kind of criticism must be taken for what
�0
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Thomas !II and D . Edelman, ·'An Eval uation o f Con servation Crime Con trol Theology" ( 19 8 8 )
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it is: not a compelling indictment of deontological or empirical desert
as being systematically harsh but simply evidence that this writer
disagrees with others about what such desert requires. ( B oth
community views and most moral philosophers in fact would
recognise that it is possible for "economic, social , cultural, or
psychological deprivations" to have an effect on deserved punishment,
but only if such deprivations significantly reduced an offender's
capacity to remain law-abiding. )
I n the same vein, another writer attacks desert as being unj ust
because, he argues, in setting offence grades it distinguishes between
an attempt and a completed offense.43 But, again, this only illustrates
that this writer thinks that doing justice requires a different rule - in
this case that it ought not take account of resulting harm. Others, of
course, disagree. (In fact, deontologists disagree among themselves about
many aspects about what desert requires, the subject of Part I I I . E . ) I t can
hardly be a criticism of deontological desert generally that not all moral
philosophers agree with your view of what desert requires.
This kind of criticism has no more impact when directed against
empirical desert: it only tells us one person ' s perspective on desert,
which may or may not reflect the community's view. Such dissenting
views can be a useful piece of data for the social scientists, but only one
piece. In the instance of the first example above - the view that
"economic, social, cultural, or psychological deprivations" by
themselves (without substantially impairing one's capacity to avoid
offending) should excuse criminal conduct - the data point is a
significant outlier; few people would take this view. Again, it is hardly
an indictment of empirical desert that there is not complete unanimity
on every principle of j ustice.
Contrast this with application of the same complaint against
vengeful desert . There the complaint goes not simply to a disagreement
with one or another liability rule but to the foundational criterion by
which punishment is to be distributed: to match the suffering caused
the victim. In that context, the complaint may have traction, for the
distributive criterion of vengeful desert fails to take account of factors,
such as culpable state of mind and excusing conditions, thus will
regularly and systematically produce punishment that is unduly harsh,
at least from the point of view of deontological and empirical desert .

B. Based on Anger and Hatred?
A related complaint against desert is its "legitimation and even
glorification of anger and hatred. "44 Because it "legitimates anger and
�3
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hatred, . . . it virtually invites the public and the legal system to indulge
the passion for revenge untroubled by moral qualms .45 It will
encourage "a peculiarly self-righteous and smug indulgence in our
society's most punitive reflexes . "46
Complaints that deserved punishment is necessarily the product
anger and hatred are similar to complaints that deserved punishment is
harsh, but also different. One might respond to the two complaints in
a similar way : by suggesting that each reveals a confusion between
vengeful desert on the one hand and deontological and empirical
desert on the other. That is, to the extent that vengeful desert is
associated with the special view of victims, it is easy to see how that
association might suggest anger and hatred toward the victimiser, a
reaction often felt by victims. Thus, one might observe that
deontological and empirical desert, in contrast to vengeful desert,
take no such victim's perspective and therefore this complaint has no
application to them . They focus on the offender, in particular on his
blameworthiness, not the victim and his injury, and certainly not the
victim's anger or hatred . Indeed, because their goal is to assess as
accurately as possible an offender's blameworthiness , it follows that
the presence of anger or hatred would be anathema to these
conceptions of desert because it risks distorting the accuracy of the
blameworthiness judgment .47 In other words, the complaint that
deserved punishment necessarily is the product of anger and hatred
reflects a failure to distinguish vengeful desert on the one hand from
deontological and empirical desert on the other - a response analogous
to the response above to the complaint that deserved punishment is
necessarily harsh .
But the complaint that desert is based upon anger and hatred also
is problematic for another reason: it is a complaint about 1notivation in
punishing rather than about the distribution of punishmen t . While the
complaint is mixed with substantive complaints about lack of justness,
it has nothing to do with justness. A distribution consistent with
deontological or empirical desert could be motivated by anger in any
particular case or by any particular punisher, but the motivation itself
does not make the punishment any more or less j ust. The same is true
of punishment based upon a vengeful desert distributio n . If a vengeful
desert distribution just happens as a matter of dumb luck to produce a
sentence that exactly matches an offender's blameworthiness in a given
case, the fact that it is motivated by anger or hatred does not make the
sentence unj ust. And conversely, if a vengeful desert distribution
45
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produces an unjust sentence ( from the perspective of deontological or
empirical desert) , the absence of anger in its imposition does not make
it j ust. A society has every reason to want its determinations of
punishment to be free of anger and hatred for a wide variety of
reasons, but the presence of that emotion itself can be only the basis
upon which to criticise the punisher, not the punishment .

C. A Preference for Prison, or Worse?
Desert is sometimes associated with a preference for imprisonment,48
or worse .49 In commenting on the M odel Penal Code's recent shift to a
desert distributive principle, one writer explains that the reform is a
mistake " because it would align the Code with the worst features of
contemporary American penal practice . . . the highest rate of
incarceration in the Western world by a factor of five . [T]his trend
has been justified . . . by legislation that . . . embraces the principle of
retribution. If the [Model] Code were to embrace this principle as well,
it would inevitably be seen as lending its support to all the
irrationalities, immoralities, and inefficiencies of our current addiction
to incarceration. 50
I f, under the vengeful conception of desert, "the punishment
should fit the crime," it might be argued that prison ought to have a
preferred place among punishment methods because it best reproduces
the victim's suffering, given the limitations placed on punishment
methods by liberal democracies. Any less severe form of punishment
would fail to match the victim suffering caused by the offender. By the
same token, the vengeful conception of desert might logically suggest
the death penalty for murder.5 1
But, because neither deontological nor empirical desert have an
interest in reprod ucing the suffering of the victim upon the o ffender,
they have no reason to give special preference to prison or to any other
punishment method. Their interest is only in insuring that a certain
amount of punishment is imposed - the amount that will put the
offender in his proper ordinal rank among other cases according to his
relative blameworthiness . Any method or methods of punishment that
achieve that result would be fully consistent with the demands of
deontological and empirical desert .52
I ndeed, because their focus is on the amount rather than the
method of punishment, deontological and empirical desert can provide
4'
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greater flexibility in the method by which punishment is imposed than
is commonly available today .53 A sentencing system o r sentencing
judge could be allowed complete discretion in fashioning any
particular sentencing method or combination of methods for a given
case, as long as the total amount of punishment imposed was that
deserved given the offender's blameworthiness . All that would be
needed would be a table that gave punishment "credit ' ' for each
punishment method according to the relative punitive "bite" of that
method. Once such a table of punishment equivalencies is established
( such tables already exist54) - setting equivalencies between fine,
weekend j ail, supervised probation, community service, and other
sanctioning methods - a sentencing j udge can be left to translate a
prison sentence into any other method or combination o f methods, so
long as the total punitive "bite" totaled the amount deserved.
This kind of sentencing f1exibility is particularly useful today, at a
time when there is interest in promoting non-incarcerative sanctions. Not
only are such sanctions typically much less costly than prison, but they
also pennit the opportunity to avoid future crime through rehabilitation,
incapacitation, o r deterrence, without subverting j ustice.

D. Only Vague Demands?: "Limiting R etributivism "
A common objection to desert as a distributive p rinciple is that it is
"too vague, " 55 that, as one writer explains: " Everyone may agree that
five years in prison is unjustly harsh desert for shoplifting, or that a
five dollar fine is unjustly lenient desert for rape, but beyond such clear
cases our intuitions seem to fail us. Is two years, five years, or ten years
the proper sanction for a rape? . . . Our sense of just deserts here seems
to desert us. "5 6 As another writer puts it, "the indeterminancy of [the
just deserts] approach . . . would at best achieve a system of 'equal
misery , ' where the scale of equality was prone to f1ux . "57
Some writers, such as Norval Morris,58 may be willing to concede
that desert is not a hopelessly vague concept, that it has some meaning,
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but would make a related but slightly different criticism: Desert cannot
specify a particular amount of punishment that should be imposed; it
can only identify a range of punishment that sho uld not be imposed
because it would be a seriously disproportionate. I ndeed, this is the
underlying assumption of the American Law Institute's recent
amendment of M odel Penal Code Section 1 .02(2)(a) that sets out the
purposes of the sentencing provisions and the principles governing
their interpretation and application : " Subsection 1 . 02(2)(a)(i) codifies
M o rris's idea of an approximate retributive ballpark when it speaks of
a 'range of severity' of proportionate punishments. "59
I f one has in mind the diluted version of the vengeful conception of
desert, the claim of vagueness may make sense; the demand that the
punishment be "proportional" to the harm caused might seem to leave a
good deal of flexibility in application. That proportionality requirement
might be taken to suggest only the need for an approximation. On the
other hand, the strict form of lex talionis - that punishment "should
correspond in degree and in kind to the offense of the wrongdoer'' 60 is not
so vague . (Admittedly, there may remain some application questions:
Exactly how is victim suffering to be measured, and how is it to be
reproduced? Doesn't every victim experience a crime differently?)
But the same vagueness complaint is even more misguided when
applied to deontological and empirical desert, with their focus on
offender blameworthiness rather than on victim suffering, although
the vagueness complaint is made about blameworthiness tooY Such
complaints are based in part on a failure to appreciate the specific
demands of these two conceptions of desert: the demands of ordinal
ranking, as opposed to the issue of punishment continuum endpoint,
as discussed in Part I I . D . l .
Those who complain about desert's vagueness seem to assume,
incorrectly, that deontological and empirical desert seek to provide a
universal, absolute amount of punishment deserved for a given
offense. But deontological and empirical desert make no such claim .
The goal of empirical and deontological desert is to ensure that
offenders of different blameworthiness are given different amounts of
punishment, each to receive an amount that reflects their differences in
blameworthinessY And that ordinal ranking does not require a
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specific amount of punishment in a universal sense. It requires imposition
of only that specific amount of punishment that will put the offender at
his appropriate ordinal rank given punishment continuum endpoin t of that
societyY That is, the uncertainty about deserved punishment amount
that M orris and others observe arises not because of any vagueness in the
ordinal ranking of offenses according to offender blameworthiness but
rather because of differences in opinion about the punishment
continuum endpoint that a society might adopt.
Deontological and empirical conceptions of desert m ay have
something useful to say about placing the punishment continuum
endpoint, but the nature of their contribution on this point is quite
different than when they serve as a distributive p rinciple for
punishment: here they identify only extremes beyond which placement
of the endpoint would be problematic. For example, the rationale
behind empirical desert suggests a limit to the punishment continuum
endpoint: It should not be placed at a point that is either so low or so
high that it will have the effect of undermining the community's
collective j udgment about whether the criminal justice system is in fact
doing justice. Notice that this j udgment is one that is necessarily
culturally dependen t . One community might accept stoning to death as
being an acceptable end point, 64 while another could rej ect fi fteen
years imprisonment as too harsh on endpoint. 6 5
This means, for example, that a society might look to other
purposes in setting the punishment continuum endpoint - perhaps
optimising deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation - and deonto
logical and empirical desert would have no objection . It is likely this
flexibility as to setting the punishment continuum endpoint has misled
writers into thinking that conceptions of desert are necessarily vague.
I t is in this proj ect, setting the punishment continuum endpoint, that
"limiting retributivism" is a useful concept. The error of those
promoting the concept is only in failing to see that it has application
only in this limited role, and has no application in the primary
function of desert in serving as a principle for determ ining how
criminal liability and punishment is to be distributed along that
punislmzen t con tinuum .
But this does not entirely settle the vagueness complaint against
deontol ogical and empirical desert. Some writers argue that even
('3
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ordinal ranking is something that can be done only in the vaguest
terms, that establishing specific rankings is impossible . 66 M any moral
philosophers may have an answer to this challenge and may be able to
give a reasoned account of how to make the kinds of j udgments called
for here.67 But it is admittedly a problem for deontological desert as a
distributive principle that different moral philosophers will have
different answers. This is not a problem of vagueness, however, but
rather a problem of disagreement, which is the subject of Part I I I . E
immediately below. The disagreement may make i t difficult to
operationalise a criminal j ustice system based upon the deontological
conception of desert, an issue discussed in Part I I I . H . , but the point
here is simply there is nothing in principle to suggest that
deontological desert could not produce a principled system for the
ordinal ranking of offenses .
As to empirical desert, it might still be argued that the blame
worthiness ranking of offenses is beyond the ability of people's
intuitions of j ustice, that those intuitions are simply too vague to do
more than to roughly distinguish between "serious" cases and "not
serio us" cases and cannot provide the nuance needed to do more. B ut
a wide variety of empirical studies paint a dramatically different
picture .6s In some studies subjects were asked to put offenses or offense
scenarios into one of a set of predetermined categories; in another kind
of study, subj ects were asked to rank order offenses or offense
scenarios; in a third kind of study, subjects were asked to assign
numerical values to each of a number of offenses or offense
scenarios. 69 The results in all of these studies are consistent : Subjects
displayed considerable nuance in the j udgments they make. 70 Small
changes in facts produce large and predictable changes in punishment.
Durham summarises the surveys this way: "Virtually without
exception, citizens seem able to assign highly specific sentences for
highly specific events . "71 The conclusion suggested by the empirical
evidence is that people take account of a wide variety of factors and
often give them quite different effect in different situations. That is,
people's intuitions of j ustice are not vague or simplistic, as claimed,
but rather sophisticated and complex .
66
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What this suggests is that, while the vagueness complaint may be
valid with regard to vengeful desert, it is misguided when applied to
deontological desert, at least in principle, and simply wrong in both
principle and practice when applied to empirical desert .
E.

Subject to Profound Disagreemen t?

Another common objection to using desert as a distributive principle
for criminal liability and punishment is the concern that, even if
individual people have a clear notion of what desert demands, it is
simply "too open to divergent interpretations . " 72
Against this complaint, both vengeful and deontological desert
have weak responses. The problem for vengeful desert arises from the
vagueness of its criterion: the vagueness of "proportionality" to victim
suffering and the subjectivity inherent in the victim perspective . The
problem for deontological desert is different . The focus of its
distributive principle is fixed and specific - an o ffender's moral
blameworthiness - but moral philosophers simply disagree about just
how this principle translates into specific punishment in a given case.
"The Retributivist label . . . might not seem particularly useful, for the
differences on particular issues among some retri butivists may seem
greater than the differences between some retributivists and some
utilitarians. 73
The same too-much-disagreement complaint has been made about
people's intuitions of justice, which would leave empirical desert in a
similar situation. I t is the common wisdom that little agreement exists
among people's intuitions of justice . 74 B ut the commo n wisdom simply
does not match the empirical reality. In fact, empirical studies show
broadly-shared intuitions that serious wrongdoing should be pun
ished, and broadly shared intuitions about the relative b lameworthi
ness of different cases. 7 5 The striking extent of the agreement on
intuitions of j ustice is illustrated in a recent study that asked subjects
to rank order 24 crime scenario descriptions according to the amount
of punishment deserved. The researchers found that the subjects
displayed an astounding level of agreement in the o rdinal ranking of
the scenarios. Subjects agreed with the modal ranking of the group for
96 percent of their pairwise ranking judgments. The most common
deviation, as one might guess, was for a subject to "flip" the ranking
72
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of two scenarios that were adjacent in the group's modal ranking - for
example, a subject might rank order the scenarios as S6, S 8 , S7, S9,
" flipping" the S7 and S8 scenarios. I f these simple " flips" of adj acent
scenarios are excluded, the percentage of all rankings that deviate from
the group mode rankings is 2. 7 percent . In, other words, "flips" aside,
subjects agreed with the modal ranking of the group in 97.7 percent of
their pairwise judgments .
A more sophisticated statistical measure of concordance is found in
Kendall ' s W coefficient of concordance, in which 1 . 0 indicates perfect
agreement and 0 . 0 indicates no agreement. In this study, the Kendall ' s
W is . 9 5 (with p < .00 1 ), a n astounding level of agreement. One might
expect to get this high a Kendall's W if subjects were asked to j udge
the relative brightness of different groupings of spots, for example.
When asked to perform more subjective or complex comparisons, such
asking travel magazine readers to rank the attractiveness of eight
different travel destinations, one gets a Kendall's W of . 5 2 . When
asking economists to rank the top 20 economics j ournals according to
quality, one gets a Kendall's W. of .095.
I ndeed, the ordinal ranking of deserved punishment in different
cases generally is consistent across demographics, including cultural
differences examined in cross-cultural studies that replicated domestic
studies. Typical of the conclusions in these studies, Newman reports
that, "it is apparent that there was considerable agreement as to the
amount of punishment appropriate to each act" and that looking at
relative rankings indicates "general agreement in ranks across all
countries. " 76
The level of agreement is strongest for those core wrongs with
which criminal law primarily concerns itself - p hysical aggression,
taking property, and deception in exchanges - and becomes less
pronounced as the nature of the offence moves farther from the core of
wrongdoing. But even where there is disagreement, empirical desert
offers means by which the disagreements can be resolved : by adopting
the majority view, or adopting the view that would least undermine the
criminal law's moral credibility with the community it governs. No
such means exists to resolve conflicting views for deontological desert.
One may wonder how this agreement among people about
intuitions of justice, sometimes at astonishing high levels, could have
been missed for so many years. One may wonder how the common
wisdom got it wrong. First, some sources of apparent disagreement are
simply misleading. When a case in the headlines has social or political
implications, it is common that its relevant facts will be perceived
differently by different people . What one makes of the police
76
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testimony in the O.J. Simpson case or the Rodney King case may
depend upon how one has come to view police officers from one's
daily life experiences. 7 7 If people draw different conclusions from the
testimony, they are likely to have different views of the relevant facts
of the case, which would predict different views on the liability and
punishment deserved .
Another source of apparent disagreement i s found i n the ordinal
ranking versus endpoint distinction, discussed in Part I I . D . l : While
people may agree on the relative b lameworthiness of a set of cases,
some people may prefer generally harsher punishments than other
people. That is, some people may set the most severe end of the
punishment continuum noticeably higher than others, which would
p redict different sentences, even if the people agree o n the relative
blameworthiness of the different offenders .
F

Fails to A void A voidable Crime?

The central criticism of desert in the English debate is that it is not the
best crime control policy. On the contrary, it is said to fail in avoiding
crimes that could be avoided by relying upon other p rinciples,
primarily deterrence or incapacitation. 78 Such dis utility is obviously
objectionable to utilitarians . And many would make the claim that
such disutility is particularly objectionable in the case of punishment :
" [P]unishment - the intentional infliction of pain - is senseless and even
cruel if it does no good, and yet retributivists favor precisely that, i . e . ,
the infliction of pain that need n o t result i n future benefi t . " 79 This sort
of objection has been aimed at the desert approach embodied in the
Criminal Justice Act 1 99 1 . 80
Traditionally, the utilitarian preference has been for distributing
liability to optimise deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, or some
combination of them. 8 1 And those consequentialists who seek to
minimise future crime would be right to point out that deontological
desert as a distributive principle would allow future crimes that could
have been avoided by a utilitarian distributive principle, such as one
that relied upon these traditional utilitarian distributive principles.
But of course this classic challenge of utilitarianism to deontolo
gical desert does not work against empirical desert because the latter's
distribution of liability and punishment is specifically designed to
77
n
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m1mmise future crime - by harnessing the crime-control power o f
social influence that comes with building the criminal law's m oral
credibility .� 2 In other words, empirical desert is a utilitarian,
consequentialist theory of punishment. It is building the community's
perception that j ustice is being done that pays crime-control dividends,
not the system's actual success as measured by deontological desert.
G.

Immoral?

Just as the utilitarian obj ection of poor crime-control has been levelled
at a desert distributive principle - with some force when applied to
deontological desert but missing the mark when applied to empirical
desert - the reverse sort of objection also can be made: that a desert
distribution is immoral .83 Some writers complain about "the inj ustice
of 'just' punishment. "84
As one might expect, the response to the immorality complaint is
essentially the reverse of the response to the disutility complaint
discussed in the previous section: The obj ection may have weight
against empirical desert but makes little sense with regard to
deontological desert. That is, while moral philosophers may well
disagree among themselves about how to translate desert into specific
principles of j ustice, all would agree that the primary goal o f a
deontological desert distribution would be to produce criminal liability
and punishment that was, above all else, moral .
On the other hand, the criticism is fair when applied to empirical
desert : What empirical desert produces is not j ustice, but only liability
and punishment consistent with the community's views about what
constitutes justice. 85 The community's intuitions of justice could be
wrong, even if there is a high degree of agreement about them. At any
particular time and place, there may be widespread support for the
morality of conduct that only later is revealed to be immoral and
unj ust, as with slave owning. To protect against this error, to be able
to identify when people's shared intuitions of justice are unj ust, a
system must turn to deontological desert to provide that transcendent
check on the j ustness of its liability rules. It is only deontological desert
that can give us the truth of what is deserved, insulated from the
vicissitudes of human irrationality and emotions.
,,
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But an examination of the modern methodology of moral
philosophers suggests that they sometimes fai l to appreciate the
importance of the difference between deontological and empirical
desert. They commonly rely heavily upon intuitions of j ustice in their
analyses, and thereby bias their conclusions in favor of principles o f
j ustice that match people's shared intuitions of justice. That reduces
the extent to which moral philosophy can be relied upon to provide the
transcendent check that empirical desert needs .
The current methodology of moral philosophers relies upon
intuitions of j ustice in a variety of ways . A standard analytic form,
if not the standard form, among moral philosophers today is to test
variations in a series of hypotheticals according to philosophers' own
intuitions about the proper resolution of each, as a basis for building
moral principles, as in Rawls' "reflective equilibrium. "86 The
differences in their j udgments about the intuitively proper resolution
of different hypotheticals are used as data points, as it were, from
which philosophers derive a moral principle, which can in turn be
tested and refined by testing that moral principle against the
philosophers' intuitions in new sets of hypotheticalsY
But the methodological reliance on intuitions o f j ustice creates a
bias in favor o f moral principles that are consistent with intuition s .
M oral principles with principled, reasoned support might nonetheless
fail to gain currency among philosophers or might be discarded,
simply because philosophers as a group think their results inconsistent
with intuitions - a practical veto by philosophers' shared intuitions .88
H.

Irnpractical to Implement?

It is common for writers to think it impractical to construct a working
criminal j ustice system based upon desert principles. F o r example, in
the internal debates among commissioners during the drafting of the
United States Sentencing Commission guidelines, it was argued that
"j ust desert" could not be used as a basis for drafting sentencing
guidelines because of "its impracticability," and because of "its
incompatibility with administrative and procedural requirements of
sentencing. "89 Yet, as noted previously, the American Law Institute
recently adopted desert as the distributive principle for the M o del
Penal Code .90 I s it, or is it not, possible to implement a distributive
x6
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principle based upon desert? Again, the answer depends upo n which
conception of desert one has in mind.
I t follows from what has been said above that it would be difficult
to produce a system of criminal liability and punishment based upon
vengeful desert . Vengeful desert fails to p rovide enough specificity as
to the exact criterion for distributing liability and punishment. What
exactly is meant by the requirement that the punishment be
"proportionate" to the harm caused by the offense?9 ' I f proportion
ality were taken to mean ordinal ranking along a fixed continuum, as
in deontological and empirical desert , it could be translated into
specific sentences , but, by itself, connected only to a concept of extent
of victim suffering, it can give only general guidance .92 Part of the
problem is the potentially subjective nature of the criterion. If the
offender's punishment is to match the victim's suffering,93 a
determination of the punishment deserved cannot be made upon the
objective facts of the offense but requires an examination of how much
this particular victim suffered from the offense. These are not
unsurmountable barriers, but coming as they do in the context of
the serious disagreements over just what vengeful desert requires,94 and
in the absence of any authoritative mechanism by which these
disagreements can be resolved, it does seem impractical to think that
vengeful desert could be used as the distributive principle for the
creation and operation of a working criminal justice system.
Nor is it clear that deontological desert can provide the basis for a
working distributive principle. Deontological desert may work in
principle to provide a specific sentence for each case, but it may not be
realistic to rely upon it in practice. The substantial disagreements
among moral philosophers about many, if not most, issues concerning
the principles of justice, and the lack of an effective means by which
people, non-philosophers especially, can reliably choose between these
cont1icting views, means that while any single moral philosopher might
be able to produce a system for distributing punishment, it may be
difficult to produce an authoritative deontological-desert-based
system.
Can empirical desert be the practical basis for a working criminal
justice system? The common wisdom is no, because of concerns about
lack of nuance and agreement discussed earlier. For example, Justice
Breyer cites lack of nuance to explain his opposition to basing the
United States Sentencing Commission sentencing guidelines on desert :
"Considering the inherent subjectivity . . . only a crude ranking of
·
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behavior in terms of j ust deserts . . . could be developed. Although
guidelines motivated by a just deserts rationale would be cloaked in
language and form that evoke rationality, using terms such as ' rank
order of serio usness, ' the rankings would not, in substantive terms, be
wholly objective . "95 He similarly argues that desert lacks the needed
level of agreement: "The difficulty that arises in applying [a desert
approach] is that different Commissioners have different views about
the correct rank order of the seriousness of different crimes. "96
The average state criminal code distinguishes a dozen grades o f
offences .97 M odern sentencing guidelines make even more distinc
tions .98 Presumably, sentencing judges would like to make even more
nuanced distinctions. Are the intuitions of laypersons that support
empirical desert nuanced enough to provide this level o f specificity?
The discussion in P arts I I I . D . and E. makes clear that lay intuitions o f
justice are both nuanced and the subject of much agreement, especially
with regard to the core wrongs that make up the m aj o rity of crimes in
practice.99 From the point of view of empirical desert, it is of no
significance that individual sentencing commissioners m ay disagree. I t
i s the community's shared intuitions o f j ustice that should control, not
the intuitions of the commissioners.
And where disagreements do exist, and there will be such instances
( especially outside the core of wrongdoing) , the logic of the empirical
desert suggests an obvious mechanism for resolving those disagree
ments: adopting the position that would least undermine the criminal
justice system's moral credibility with the community, perhaps
following the majority view in many cases but also taking account
of arguments on the justness of its position as would come out in
public debate. 1 00 I ndeed, existing empirical studies tell us not only that
people agree about the relative blameworthiness of different cases, but
also do much to map for us the contours of people's agreement and
disagreement. And they map not only the relative seriousness o f
different wrongdoing but also the factors that increase and decrease a
violator's blameworthiness . One collection of studies reports commu
nity views on the liability rules that govern such widely-ranging topics
as the objective requirements for attempt, liability for creating a
prohibited risk, the objective requirements for complicity, the
95
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requirements for omission liability, the use of force in self-defence, the
use of force in defence of property, citizens' law enforcement
authority, offence culpability requirements, the culpability require
ments for complicity, the liability rules that should govern voluntary
intoxication, insanity, immaturity, involuntary intoxication, duress,
entrapment, the requirements of sexual offences, the significance of a
person's causal connection with the prohibited result (causation
requirements), the felony-murder rule, and the rules that should
govern the punishment of multiple related offences. 1 0 1
I t i s also true, however, that more research is needed. As much
ground as the existing studies cover, they each touch only the b asics in
their specific subject . M ore importantly, while there is a literature
describing the intuitions of laypersons as a group and there is a
literature documenting the existence of many areas of high agreement,
these two literatures need to be combined . That is, we need to
understand better not only the details of the community's shared
intuitions on a wide variety of issues, but also to understand the
contours and demographics of disagreement. 1 0�
But one might argue that there are any number of instances in
which one would want the system's principles of justice to deviate from
people's intuitions of justice. Thus, it might be argued, deviations from
empirical desert and the concomitant undermining of the system 's
moral credibility are inevitable and, therefore, a system based upon
empirical desert is necessarily doomed to failure. Every perceived
deviation from desert would undermine the system's moral credibi lity
and thereby its crime-control effectiveness.
I t is true that one would want to deviate from people's intuitions of
justice, even intuitions on which there is broad agreement, for any
number of reasons. First, people's intuitions of justice may prove to be
immoral, in a transcendent deontological sense, as discussed in Part
I I I . G. Further, it is clear that there exist a variety of societal interests
that are sufficiently important to outweigh the crime-control benefits
of an empirical desert distribution, such as fair notice, procedural
fai rness, and the need to control police and to limit governmental
intrusion in private lives . 1 03 Still further, a society may wish to use
criminal law to change people's intuitions of justice, toward a view
seen as more compatible with the societal values to which the
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community aspires. For example, the community may decide that it
wishes actively to change people's existing intuitions about the relative
seriousness of drunk driving, domestic violence, same-sex intercourse,
insider-trading, or internet-facilitated copyright piracy.
So it is true that in any real world criminal justice system, it will b e
inevitable that t h e system will in some instances deviate fro m people's
intuitions of justice. But the fact that some deviation occurs does not
mean that the goal of building law's moral credibility necessarily fails.
That is, there is little reason to believe that any and every deviation
from a person's intuitions of j ustice will completely destroy the
criminal j ustice system's moral credibility in that person's eyes .
Rather, it seems more likely that the process is one o f incremental
effect. 1 04 The better the system does at regularly tracking people's
intuitions of justice, the stronger its moral credibility with them. The
more it deviates from empirical desert, the lower its moral credibility.
The conclusion, then, is not that there is no value in adopting
empirical desert as a distributive p rinciple but rather j ust the opposite:
Given that some deviation is inevitable, the system ought not deviate
where it can avoid doing so, in order to advance its moral credibility
whenever it has the opportunity to do so. Thus, the system ought not
to deviate from empirical desert unless the benefits from that deviation
are clear and substantial enough to outweigh the cost in undermining
its moral credibility.
Another claim of impracticability is of this sort: Each offender feels
punishment differently, therefore it is impossible as a p ractical matter
to construct a punishment system that gives each offender the
punishment he deserves. 1 0 5 In other words, it would be impossible to
construct a punishment "equivalency table, " as discussed pre
viously, 1 06 because the unique way in which each offender experiences
punishment means that the "equivalency table" would have to be
different for each offender. While this may be true with regard to
deontological desert, which concerns itself with giving each offender
the punishment that he personally deserves, the obj ection is inapplic
able to empirical desert. Empirical desert concerns itself with giving
not the punishment that each individual offender actually deserves but
rather with the amount of punishment called for under the principles
that track the community's intuitions of justice - it is the community's
1 04
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perception of the criminal justice system's moral authority that counts,
not the transcendent truth of the punishment the offender deserves.
Empirical desert calls not for an equivalency table set according to the
extent of each offender's reaction to each kind of punishment, but
rather for an equivalency table set according to the community's
collective j udgment of the relative punitive bite among different
punishment methods .
IV.

S U MMAR Y :

A MORE DETAILED A CCOUNT OF THREE CONCEPTIONS
OF D ESERT

I n the course of Part I I I a good deal of detail h as been added to the
picture of the three conceptions of desert presented in Part I I . It may
be useful to pull these poi nts together in a way that summarises the
strength and weakness of each as a distributive p rinciple for criminal
liability and punishment .
Vengeful desert focuses upon the offense harm and, i n its strictest
form, sets the deserved punishment to match this amount of harm ,
preferably imposed through the same or a related method as the
offence cond uct. In a less literal view, an exact equivalency of method
and amount is not necessary for deserved punishment; generally
proportionality is enough . Typically, this will mean that serious
offences will req ui re prison, o r something more seri ous. The exact
amount of punishment deserved is not clear; only a general range of
punishment, proportionate to the harm caused, is necessary, and
people tend to disagree about just how much punishment is enough in
any given case, which tends to undercut the practicality of translating
this conception of desert into a workable criminal justice system. Even
if it were practical, s uch a conception of desert would produce
common and significant deviations from what moral philosophers and
the community would perceive to be j ust . Such a distribution therefore
would suffer the crime control costs of such deviations, but without
the crime-control benefits that might derive from the traditional
utilitarian mechanisms for fighting crime, such as general deterrence,
incapacitation of the dangerous, or rehabilitation as d istributive
princi ples .
Deontological desert and empirical desert differ from vengeful
desert in a number of important ways . Their primary concern is setting
punishment that puts the offender in his proper ordinal rank
according to his moral blameworthiness, rather than a concern for
the absolute amount of punishment imposed or for the exact severity
of the punishment continuum endpoint. Once that endpoint is set,
which all societies must do, the demands of deontological and
empirical desert are quite specific. These conceptions of desert also
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differ from vengeful desert in that their focus is almost exclusively on
the amount of punishment, not the method by which i t is imposed,
thus, they have no preference for prison. (These conceptions of desert
can play a role in setting the general severity of punishment, in
determining the punishment continuum endpoint, but only to suggest
a range of punishment severity beyond which the endpoint should not
be set. In other words, " limiting retributivism" may well make sense in
this context, even if it is inappropriate as a distributive principle for
punishment.)
Deontological desert differs from empirical desert i n that the
former offers a transcendent truth about j ustice, while the latter offers
only the community's intuitions of j ustice . In that regard, deontolo
gical desert would seem to provide an advantage over empirical desert
because the latter suffers from the fact that people's intuitions o f
j ustice may b e unj ust, i n a transcendent moral sense. I n contrast,
deontological desert suffers a number of difficulties as a distributive
principle that empirical desert does not. There is significant disagree
ment among moral philosophers about the principles of j ustice, which
makes it difficult use it as the basis for constructing a working criminal
j ustice system. It also may be criticised as failing to avoid avoidable
crime. One might be tempted to use it nonetheless, perhaps in
conjunction with empirical desert, to provide a transcendent check on
the principles of justice derived from the community's shared
intuitions of justice, but because of modern moral philosophy's heavy
reliance upon intuitions of j ustice, there is some question as to whether
it can effectively perform even this role.
Empirical desert distributes punishment according to the principles
of justice derived from the community's shared intuitions . There is a
good deal of agreement on these intuitions, at least regarding those
core wrongs that make up the central part of criminal law, and it is
practicable to construct a criminal j ustice system based upon this
conception. Its primary focus is assuring that an offender receives the
punishment that will place him at his appropriate ordinal rank
according to his blameworthiness ( although empirical desert can also
have some influence in a society's setting the endpoint of its
punishment continuum, but in this role, it operates only by i dentifying
extremes beyond which the endpoint should not be set) . Empirical
desert does not suffer the standard disutility objection leveled against
deontological desert because it is designed to advance the i nterests of
effective crime contro l : by building system's moral credibility with the
community, it harnesses the enormous power of social influence . But it
is subject to the valid criticism that it may prod uce results that, while
they reflect the community's shared intuitions of j ustice, nonetheless
may be unjust in the sense of a transcendent truth of j ustice .
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CONCLUSION
I t has been argued here that the failure to appreciate the existence of
three quite distinct conceptions of desert - vengeful, deontological , and
empirical - commonly leads to confusion in the critique of desert as a
principle for the distribution of criminal liability and punishment.
Criticisms of desert are commonly offered without appreciating that a
criticism may be valid with regard to one conception of desert but not
another, thus leading writers to reject " desert" generally while in fact
their criticisms only suggest rejecting one specific conception of desert.
And where desert is adopted as a distributive principle, the failure to
appreciate the different conceptions creates confusion in its applica
tion. Arguments based on one conception of desert are used as the
basis for an application based upon a different conception. It is not
uncommon to see writers switch between different conceptions of
desert during their analysis without acknowledging, or perhaps even
realising, that they are doing so.
Distinguishing the three modern conceptions of desert m ay clarify
the te1ms of the debate, but it m ight not. Consider this: I n speculating
about the cause of the confusions reviewed in Part I I I , it may strike
one as an odd coincidence that the modern scholars who make use of
the vengeful conception of desert commonly are those who oppose
it. 107 It is hard to know whether this is cause or effect. Do they oppose
a desert distributive principle because they conceive of desert in the
terms described here as vengeful desert? Or, do they treat " desert" in
their writings as having the characteristics of vengeful desert because
they oppose a desert distribution, and vengeful desert p rovides the
ugliest straw man available to help them rally the opposition they
seek? But even if some misunderstandings in the current debate are not
accidental, an account of the important distinctions among modern
conceptions of desert can at least make it more difficult to mislead .
Whatever the cause of the confusion, it seems clear that the
usefulness of the ongoing debate over desert as a distributive principle
can only be enhanced by distinguishing these three conceptions of it.
Given the recently increasing popularity of desert, clarification of the
debate has not only academic but practical importance.
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